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Full Research Paper

Research on Strategies of Advertising and Revenue Sharing
on Webcast Platform
Hu Jiao, Li Li*, Chen Baixue
School of Economics & Management, Nanjing University of Science & Technology, Nanjing, Jiangsu, 210094, China

Abstract: The webcast advertising market exhibits two unique features: the webcast platform and the anchor jointly provide
webcast advertising; and the webcast platform determines the share of advertising revenue, the anchor decides whether to
publish ads. We develop a two-sided market model including webcast platform, anchor, fan users and advertisers to analyze
the role of these two unique features in determining the webcast platform’s optimal advertising revenue-sharing decision.
The research results reveal an interesting inverted-V-shaped dynamic structure, that is, the optimal advertising revenue
sharing strategy of the webcast platform changes with the overall advertisers’ valuation of the webcast ads. When the
valuation of advertising is at a medium level, the webcast platform is motivated to give up more revenue share to subsidize
the anchor via the advertising channel, leading to greater profits for both of them. In all regions, the optimal profits of the
webcast platform and the anchor increase as the switching cost of fan increases. The anchor can increase fan stickiness by
providing high-quality content, thereby increasing fan loyalty and expanding the fan user base.

Keywords: webcast advertising; two-sided market; advertising; revenue sharing

1.

INTRODUCTION
With the popularity of the Internet and the rapid development of online video, webcast platforms have

shown explosive growth. According to CNNIC (China Internet Network Information Center), as of June 2020,
the scale of webcasting users in China has reached 562 million, accounting for 59.8% of the total netizens. The
great success of the webcast has built a huge fan base of users and attracted potential advertisers. In order to
develop itself and benefit from the market, the webcast platform began to provide advertising services. That is,
the anchor implants ads into the webcasting process so that the anchor and the platform can obtain income from
two channels, namely, fan rewards and webcast advertising. Correspondingly, along with fan reward income,
webcast advertising has become another important source of income for both the platform and the anchor.
Different from traditional media ads, webcast ads are provided by the platform and the anchor, and the
platform and the anchor belong to a cooperative relationship. Traditional media channels, such as newspapers
and TV, have control over advertising, while the control over webcast advertising is separate. The webcast
platform needs to motivate anchors to publish ads during the webcasting process, thus being able to profit from
the advertising channel. According to the principal-agent incentive theory, if the anchor chooses to publish ads,
the webcast platform will share part of the advertising revenue with the anchor to increase the anchor's
motivation. For example, the Huya webcast platform and the anchor jointly provide ads, and the Huya platform
decides virtual gift price and advertising price, and the Huya platform (30%) and anchors (70%) share revenue
from fan reward and advertising channels. In fact, if the anchor chooses to place ads, the platform and the
anchor can obtain advertising revenue, thereby increasing the revenue from the advertising channel. But at the
same time, the increase of ads placed by the anchor in the webcast content will arouse the nuisance of the fans,
which will lower the revenue that the platform and the anchor obtain from the fans' reward. It can be seen that
the advertising strategy decided by the anchor has a certain impact on the revenue of both the platform and the
*
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anchor. Relatively, the level of the advertising revenue share of the webcast platform decision also has a decisive
role in the choice of advertising strategy of the anchor. In other words, whether the ad revenue sharing contract
can increase the anchor's revenue is an important issue for the anchor's participation in advertising activities.
Therefore, how to make the optimal advertising revenue sharing contract to coordinate the interests between the
webcast platform and the anchor is an urgent problem in the field of webcasting.
Based on the above background, this paper focuses on the problem of webcast ad delivery and the resulting
ad pricing and ad revenue sharing contract strategies. In the webcast advertising market, the platform decides
the ad price and ad revenue share, while the anchor decides whether to publish the ads or not (Godes et al. 2009)
[1]

.
Taking into account the separation structure of the platform and the anchor in the webcast advertising, in

this paper, we try to answer the following question:
Q1. How does the optimal ad revenue share of the webcast platform affect the anchor decisions?
Q2. Considering the anchor's advertising strategy, how does the webcast platform set the optimal
advertising price and ad revenue share?
Q3. Whether the advertising revenue sharing decided by the platform can coordinate the interest conflict
between the webcast platform and the anchor?
2.

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Two-sided market for traditional advertising.
In recent years, researchers have used two-sided market models to analyze the traditional advertising
market, such as newspaper and television advertising. Gabszewicz et al. (2005)

[2]

investigated whether

advertising subsidized the price of consumers purchasing newspapers by constructing a two-sided market model
between the newsprint media and the advertising industry. Using a similar two-sided market model framework,
Godes et al. (2009)

[1]

demonstrated that when a media company earns revenue from both content sales and

advertising channels, and when the competition in market content intensifies, the media company will focus on
monetizing the advertising channel. Bagwell (2007)

[3]

provides a comprehensive overview of the advertising

economy, stating that advertising revenue is the main revenue source for media companies and that they have
some control over advertising prices. The above literature shows that studies on traditional advertising two-sided
markets are based on the premise that the media platform has the right to publish ads, and that the media is able
to profit from the dual channels of content and advertising.
Different from the existing literature, this paper considers the advertising strategy between the webcast
platform and the anchor in the case of separation of advertising control rights, where the webcast platform and
the anchor jointly participate in making the advertising and revenue strategies, which enriches the existing
two-sided market theory of advertising.
2.2. Online advertising
Current research has examined multiple aspects of online advertising strategies and their interactions with
other corporate strategies, such as advertising volume, advertising pricing, and distribution of spending and
revenue.
Regarding the advertising volume, the existing literature mainly studies the trade-off between content and
advertising (Prasad et al. 2003)
advertising (Dana et al. 2016)

[4]

, dynamic advertising (Kumar et al. 2009)

[5]

, and the optimal combination of

[6]

. On the issue of ad pricing strategies, researchers have studied and compared

various pricing models for advertising. For instance, Asdemir et al. (2012)

[7]

examined the optimal advertising

decisions under two pricing models: cost-per-thousand-impressions (CPM) and cost-per-click (CPC). Mailléet
al. (2018) [8]compared the changes in the advertiser's revenue under the pure CPC, CPM, and the combined CPC
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and CPM model.
In terms of advertising spending and revenue allocation, the researchers studied the interaction of
advertising spending and revenue allocation strategies with other strategies of the firms. For example, Tan et al.
(2005)

[9]

explored the coordination of the advertising and IT capability spending allocations in the e-tailing

industry. Lin et al. (2012) [10]used game theory to study the advertising strategies of online service providers in a
monopolistic and duopoly market environment and found that higher advertising revenue rates may lead to
lower service prices. Hao et al. (2017) [11]studied the optimal allocation strategies of the platform for content and
advertising revenue under the separation mode of mobile platform and APP provider, and obtained the
applicable conditions under different profit models of the platform. Guo et al. (2019)

[12]

first conducted an

economic analysis of reward advertising and found that high reward rates may reduce the number of reward ads.
The research results of the above literature provide important theoretical approaches and research
perspectives for comprehension of webcast advertising and revenue allocation decisions. However, it is not
difficult to find that the above literature has two shortcomings: (1) Although the existing research results on
online advertising decisions involve the optimal combination strategy of webcast advertising, they do not
mention the issue of anchors' participation in advertising decisions in the field of webcasting. In fact, the anchor
has control over the advertising publishing in the process of webcast advertising, and the anchor's decisions
have a direct impact on whether the webcast platform can obtain revenue from the advertising channel. (2)
Existing studies do not segment consumers when considering the nuisance cost brought by advertising to
consumers (Prasad et al. 2003)

[4]

. With the diversified development of online advertising, the characteristics of

consumer groups on different online platforms are very different, and this study constructs a two-sided market
model for webcast advertising that considers the transfer costs of fan users, which is more realistic.
2.3. Webcast platform
Regarding on the webcast platform, researchers have discussed the revenue distribution and the economic
effects of the anchor. Zheng et al. (2020)

[13]

used a principal-agent theory model to study the optimal reward

revenue sharing problem of the webcast platform under the non-contracted and contracted models. Chen et al.
(2020)

[14]

empirically analyzed the mechanism of the role of personal traits of the anchor in webcast platforms

on fans' purchase intentions, found that the stronger the personal traits of anchors, the higher the perceived value
of their recommended products and the stronger the purchase intentions of fans. The current research on webcast
platforms has revealed the interest correlation between the platform, the anchor, and the fans, as well as the
problem of revenue sharing between the platform and the anchor. However, existing studies have mainly
explored the revenue-sharing decision of platforms under a single fan reward channel (Zheng et al. 2020)

[13]

,

and there is not much literature on how platforms formulate ad revenue share contracts under the case of anchor
participation in advertising. Therefore, we investigate the optimal ad revenue sharing strategy of the webcast
platform in two scenarios: the anchor chooses to place ads or not, in order to differentiate from existing studies.
In summary, the marginal contributions of this study are as follows: first, unlike the two-sided market of
traditional advertising, traditional media platform has full control over advertising, and this paper considers the
platform and the anchor as two independent entities for webcast advertising. The platform decides advertising
pricing and advertising revenue sharing, while the anchor decides whether to publish ads. Second, based on the
revenue model of the fan reward channel, this paper discusses the optimal advertising pricing and advertising
revenue sharing of the platform under the strategy of the anchor publishing and not publishing ads. It is found
that the webcast platform can subsidize the anchor through advertising revenue sharing, and then encourage the
anchor to participate in the advertising, so that both the platform and the anchor can obtain greater benefits from
the dual channels. Third, with the rapid development of webcast platforms, the anchor can place ads during the
webcast. Since the fans watching the webcast have certain stickiness and loyalty to the anchor, it is more
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practical to consider the impact of the switching cost of fan users in the modeling of advertising decisions.
3.

MODEL DEVELOPMENT
In this section, we present a two-sided market model for the webcast advertising which includes a webcast

platform, an anchor who provides content services, a mass of fan users who watch the webcast and participate in
rewards, and a mass of advertisers as shown in Figure 1.
Nuisance cost 

Webcast Platform

rA p A
Advertiser

（sets p A and rA ）

ru pu

pA

pu
(1  rA ) p A

Anchor
（Decide whether to
publish ads）

Fan users
（Virtual gifts
reward）

(1  ru ) pu

Switching cost s

Figure 1.

The two-sided market model of webcast advertising

3.1. Webcast platform and anchor
First of all, in the fans’ reward channel, fans will buy virtual gifts on the webcast platform to reward their
favorite anchor. The platform sets the virtual gift price pu . The platform’s virtual gift revenue share ru , which is
an exogenous variable. The platform will transfer the remaining reward revenue share 1  ru to the anchor
according to the contract. Without loss of generality, assuming pu  0 , the platform and the anchor can always
get the fans' reward share.
In the decision of webcast advertising channel, the webcast platform decides: (i) the ad price p A charged to
the advertiser (pay per user view), and (ii) the platform’s ad revenue share rA . If the anchor agrees to this ad
revenue sharing contract, he will publish the ad during his webcast and receive the remaining 1  rA share of the
ad revenue.
If the anchor chooses to advertise, he will display the advertiser's product ad during the webcast. We use n A
to denote the number of participating advertisers and m to denote the total number of potential advertisers.
According to existing literature (Godes et al. 2009) [1], we assume that each advertiser publishes one ad, so n A
can be interpreted as the number of ads in the platform’s ad inventory, that is, the ad demand. We use  to denote
fill rate, which represents the probability that the platform’s ad space will be filled with an ad from the ad
inventory upon an ad request. We assume fill rate has the form    nA , so  denotes the probability of each ad
being displayed, then  m  1 .
3.2. Fan Users
We assume that the nuisance cost when the webcast process is filled with ads is  . Therefore, the expected
nuisance cost of displaying webcast ads is    nA . Assuming that the fan users of the anchor have watched
the webcast for a long time and invested a certain amount of time, emotion, etc., there is a stickiness between
fan users and the anchor, resulting in a non-negative switching cost of s . We consider a single representative
anchor, and take fan users to be heterogeneous in their valuation for the webcast content vu which is uniformly
distributed on 0,Vu  . The total size of the webcast user market is normalized to 1.
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Thus, for fan user vu , the utility for the user, (1) if the anchor chooses to publish advertising, is as
follows: U(vu )=vu   nA  s  pu . The corresponding number of fan users who have rewarded the anchor is as
follows: nu  Pr( U(vu )  0)  1 

 nA
Vu



s pu

.
Vu Vu

(2) If the anchor decides against publishing ads, the utility of the fan user vu is U(vu )=vu  s  pu . The
corresponding

number

of

follows: nu  Pr( U(vu )  0)  1 

fan

users

who

have

rewarded

the

anchor

is

as

s pu

.
Vu Vu

3.3. Advertisers
We take advertisers to be heterogeneous in their valuation for advertising v A , the value the advertiser can
obtain through publishing his ad. Assume v A is uniformly distributed on 0,VA  ( Rochet and Tirole 2006) [15], then,
the profit function for an advertiser with valuation for advertising v A is as follows:

 A (vA )   (vA  pA )nu
Where nu is the number of fan users and p A is the ad price. An advertiser would participate if and only if

 A (vA )  0 . Thus, the ad demand nA is as follows:
nA  m Pr( A (vA )  0)  m(1 

pA
).
VA

3.4. Profit
We can now determine that when the anchor chooses to publish ads, the platform’s profit is the sum of the
revenue share from the fan user's reward and the advertising, so the platform’s profit is as follows:

 O1  ru pu nu  rA  pA nu nA , and the anchor’s is as follows:  1R  (1  ru ) pu nu  (1  rA ) pA nu nA .
Conversely, if the anchor chooses not to publish ads, the profit of the webcast platform is:  O0  ru pu nu and
,
the profit function of the anchor become  R0  (1  ru ) pu nu .
We assume that when the anchor obtains a fan user's reward revenue share 1-ru , he is willing to participate
in the webcast activities of the platform. The timing of the game is as follows. In stage 1, the platform
announces the ad price p A , the ad revenue share rA and the virtual gift price pu . In stage 2, the anchor decides
whether to publish ads. In stage 3, the fan user decides whether to reward the anchor and advertisers decide
whether to participate.
4.

EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
Since this study mainly discusses the issue of the anchor’s advertising and platform revenue sharing

decisions, the following analysis will focus on exploring the impact of changes in platform advertising pricing
and advertising revenue sharing on the anchor participating in advertising activities. In this section, we use
backward induction to first analyze the anchor’s strategy and then derive the platform’s equilibrium advertising
revenue-sharing contract.
4.1. Anchor equilibrium decision
Lemma 1 Given the platform’s decisions on ad price p A and ad revenue share rA , the anchor will
(a) (Not publish ads) become a pure deliver webcast content, that is, decline to publish ads, and all
revenue comes from fan rewarding. At this time, the webcast platform decides the virtual gift price as follows:

pu  

Vu  s
,
2

if 1 

(1  ru )
 rA  1 ;
pA

(b) (Publish ads) become an ad publisher and charge a positive price for the webcast content, so her
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revenue comes from ads and fan rewarding. At this time, the webcast platform decides the virtual gift price as
follows:

pu  

Vu  s  m(VA  pA )( ru  rA pA )

,
2
2ruVA

if 0  rA  1 

(1  ru )
.
pA

According to the parameter constraints, setting ru  0.3 , VA  5 , Vu  1 , s  0.5 ,   0.2 ,   1 , m  1 ,

0  pA  VA , 0  rA  1 .
The regions corresponding to case a, and b are illustrated in Figure 2. Figure 2 illustrates the anchor’s best
responses to the platform’s decisions on ad price p A and her ad revenue share rA .

Figure 2. The anchor’s strategy

From Figure 2, in region a, a low ad price p A , a high platform’s ad revenue share rA , or a combination of
both limits the anchor’s ad revenue per fan user, that is, the anchor’s ad revenue per fan user (1  rA ) pA nA is
low; and thus the anchor does not have sufficient incentive to publish ads. When the anchor’s ad revenue per
user (1  rA ) pA nA is higher than a threshold (in region b), the anchor chooses to publish ads and generates
revenue from both advertising and fan rewarding. From Lemma 1, we can see that the revenue from the fan
reward in region a is higher than that in region b, which indicates that the anchor will lose the fan reward
revenue when switching from the not publish ads strategy to the publish ads strategy. In other words, the fan
nuisance cost of advertising is reflected by the revenue reduction from the webcast rewarding. When the anchor
agrees to publish ads, she will gain an additional revenue source from the advertising channel in the amount
of (1  rA ) pA nu nA . This shows that a reasonable share of advertising revenue will motivate the anchor to
participate in advertising, that is, the anchor has additional incentives to reduce her profit from fan reward in
order to gain revenue from the advertising channel.
4.2. Webcast platform equilibrium decision
Anticipating the anchor’s responses, the platform sets the ad price p A and her ad revenue share rA to
maximize her profit. Lemma 2 summarizes the equilibrium strategy for the platform and the corresponding
equilibrium ad price and ad revenue share.
Lemma 2 Depending on market conditions, the platform adopts one of the following three sets of ad
price p A and her ad revenue share rA in equilibrium:
(a) (Not publish ads) If VA   , then set the ad price p A and ad revenue share rA to satisfy

1

V s
(1  ru )
 rAa  1 . The corresponding equilibrium virtual gift price is pu   u
.
2
pA
(b1) (Publish ads: Reward-dominant) If   VA  VAab1 , the anchor decides to advertise ，

when  O1 pA  0 , then set the ad price p A and ad revenue share rA to satisfy pbA1 

2(1  ru )
VA  
, rAb1 =1 
.
2
VA +
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The corresponding equilibrium virtual gift price is pub1 

Vu  s  m(VA   )(4 ru  VA   )

.
2
8ruVA

(b2) (Publish ads: Ad-dominant) If VA  VAab1 , when  O1 pA  0 , then set the ad price p A and ad
revenue share rA to satisfy pbA2 

VA  
2r 
4VAVu (1  ru ) 2
VA -
, rAb 2  u +
. The corresponding

2
VA + (2-ru )(VA +）  m(2-ru )(VA2   2 )
b 2
u

equilibrium virtual gift price is p

b2
b2 b2
Vu  s  m(VA  p A )( ru  rA p A )


.
2
2ruVA

The anchor agrees to publish advertising. When the platform obtaining the fan reward share is greater than
the

ad

revenue

share,

When ru pu nu  rA  pA nu nA

is VAab1 = +

the

fan

,

pbA1 

reward

VA  
2

is

a

, rAb1 =1 

dominant

revenue

2(1  ru )
VA +

,we

2ru ( s  2 m  Vu )  2 ru [3 m (s  Vu )  ru (s  2 m  Vu ) 2 ]

m

for

solve

the
the

webcast

platform.

threshold

for VA

.

According to the parameter constraints, setting ru  0.3 , Vu  1 , s  0.5 ,   0.2 ,   1 , m  1 . Figure 3
illustrates the equilibrium strategies for the webcast platform under different parameters of ad value VA .

Figure 3. The webcast platform’s strategy

Figure 3 shows that, the platform declines to publish advertising when ad value VA is less than the nuisance
cost  . When VA is greater than the nuisance cost  , in both cases b1 and b2, the platform sets the ad price p A
and her ad revenue share rA to induce the anchor to publish ads, so her revenue comes from both advertising and
fan reward. We call regions b1 and b2 hybrid regions, with b1 being the reward-dominant hybrid region in
which the ad value VA is relatively low, such that the advertising revenue is mainly powered by the number of fan
users; and b2 being the ad-dominant hybrid region in which the ad value VA is relatively high, such that the
advertising revenue is mainly powered by the number of advertisers.
The ad value VA is an important market condition parameter in determining the advertising revenue-sharing
contract in our model, which represents the overall advertisers’ valuation of advertising at the market level. We
find that the equilibrium ad price p A increases in ad value VA in all regions. When advertisers are able to generate
higher value from reaching fan users through ads (higher VA ), more advertisers will join and the platform will
charge a higher ad price p A to take advantage of such improvements.
4.3. Equilibrium analysis
Lemma 3 The platform’s ad revenue share rA has the following properties:
① rA increases in the reward-dominant region, that is,
② rA increases in the ad-dominant region, that is,

rAb1 2 (1  ru )

 0；
VA (VA   ) 2

2(r  1)2 (m (VA   )2   2(VA2   2 )Vu )
rAb 2
- u
0。
VA
m (VA   )2 (VA   )2 (ru  2)

According to the parameter constraints, setting ru  0.3 , Vu  1 ,   0.2 ,   1 , m  1 . Lemma 3 and
Figure 4 reveal an interesting inverted-V-shaped dynamic of the platform’s ad revenue-sharing strategy with
respect to the ad value VA .
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Figure 4. Platform’s Ad Revenue Share rA

Figure 4 shows that, when ad value VA is low in the reward-dominant region, as VA increases, the webcast
platform keeps a higher share of the ad revenue. However, in the downward sloping section of the
inverted-V-shaped, where ad value VA is moderate in the ad-dominant region, the webcast platform is willing to
subsidize the anchor by forgoing more ad revenue share, even though each share is worth more as ad value VA
increases.
To explain this inverted-V-shaped dynamic, we introduce the webcast platform’s maximum ad revenue
share rA . When inducing the anchor to publish ads, the webcast platform cannot withhold an ad revenue share
higher than rA since she needs to provide the anchor a sufficiently high share to guarantee that the anchor’s profit
from being an ad publisher is at least equal to his profit from staying with the a region (not publish ads).
Intuitively, given any ad value VA , the webcast platform could set rA  rA to maximize her ad revenue share and
meanwhile induce the anchor to publish ads. However, this is not always optimal for the webcast platform.
While the platform’s optimal ad revenue share rA is equal to rA in the reward-dominant region ( rAb1  rA ), it
becomes less than rA once the ad value VA increases into the ad-dominant region ( rAb 2  rA ). Essentially, in the
reward-dominant region (b1) the webcast platform extracts the anchor’s additional surplus from ad publishing
beyond the a region, thus making the anchor’s total profit under publishing ads equal to that under pure fan
reward. Yet in the ad-dominant region (b2), with the increase of advertising value, more and more advertisers
are willing to participate, which induces the webcast platform to forgo part of ad revenue share to encourage the
anchor to publish more ads, thereby increasing the profit of the webcast platform.
Lemma 4 In all regions (publish ads or not publish ads), the optimal profit of the webcast platform and the
anchor will increase with the increase of the fan users switching cost s , and decrease with the increase of the
advertising nuisance cost  , that is,
 O0 ru pu
 R0 (1  ru ) pu

 0,

0;
s
Vu
s
Vu
 O1 ru pu +rA  pA nA
 1R (1  ru ) pu +(1-rA )  p A nA

 0,

 0,
s
Vu
s
Vu
 O1
r p +r  p n
(1  ru ) pu +(1-rA )  pA nA
 1R
 -  nA u u A A A  0 ,
 -  nA
0.

Vu

Vu

Proposition 4 reveals the impact of fan switching cost and advertising nuisance cost on the profits of the
webcast platform and the anchor. In all regions, the optimal profit of the webcast platform and the anchor
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increases with the increase of switching cost and decreases with the increase of advertising nuisance cost. In the
case of not publishing ads, the profit of the platform and the anchor comes only from fan reward, and the level
of fan switching cost indirectly reflects the level of their rewards. Intuitively, those with higher switching cost
pay more in terms of emotion, effort, etc., and their reward amounts will be greater in response. In the case of
publishing ads, both the platform and the anchor obtain revenue from the dual channels of fan reward and
advertising respectively, but the anchor's decision to publish ads will inevitably increase the aversion of fans.
The revelation is that the anchor can provide quality webcast content to reduce fans' aversion to advertising.
This will incur some expenditure, but both the platform and the anchor will be able to gain extra profit from the
advertising.
5.

CONCLUSIONS
In this study, we construct the two-sided market model of the webcast advertising to capture the unique

characteristics of the webcast advertising market. Specifically we incorporate two entities in the webcast
advertising—the anchor, who has the right to decide whether to publish ads, and the webcast platform, who
determines the advertising price for advertisers and the platform’s and the anchor’s respective shares of
advertising revenue. The results show that:
(1) In mixed regions with mainly reward-dominant and ad-dominant, the ad equilibrium price increases as
the ad valuation increases. In other words, when advertisers can reach more consumers by publishing ads,
expanding the potential market demand, and generating higher advertising value, more advertisers will be
willing to join the webcast market, and the webcast platform can take advantage of the high advertising
valuation to charge higher advertising fees.
(2) As advertisers' ad values increase, the level of ad revenue sharing of webcast platform decisions rises
and then falls. Intuitively, as ad value increases the webcast platform will increase its ad revenue share, as each
ad share brings higher value. Interestingly, the ad revenue share appears to be downwardly sloping in part. When
the ad value is moderate, the webcast platform is willing to forego part of the ad revenue share to subsidize the
anchor and motivate him/her to participate in advertising activities actively. On the one hand, the anchor
choosing to publish ads incurs certain nuisance costs and thus loses a portion of its profits. The webcast platform
subsidizes anchors through advertising channels, increasing the advertising revenue share to a level that exceeds
the minimum level required for an anchor to be willing to publish ads. On the other hand, the platform's subsidy
strategy provides additional incentives for the anchor to create better quality webcast content and increase the
stickiness with fans, bringing a win-win for both the platform and the anchor. The management insight is that
when the webcast platform can get revenue from both fan reward and advertising, the platform should actively
coordinate the interest conflict with the anchor by adjusting the ad revenue share, and then to compensate the
anchor for the loss of fan reward revenue due to publishing ads.
(3) In all regions, the optimal profit of the webcast platform and the anchor increases with the switching
cost of fan increases and decreases with the increase of the advertising nuisance cost. The anchor provides
high-quality webcast content, which increases the stickiness with fan users. When the positive effect of the fan
switching cost is enough to offset the negative effect of the advertising nuisance cost, the anchor may choose to
publish ads, and then obtain benefits from both the advertising channel and the fan reward channel.
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